If you're thinking of setting up some of your assets in the cloud, you need to think about how you can do that without compromising your network security monitoring standards and how you can meet compliance regulations. Even if you run an Intrusion Detection (and/or Prevention) System in your organization or have host-based IDS, securing the cloud is a different matter. Read this article to learn how the MSS secures assets in the cloud.
10 Gbps Snort multiprocessing with PF_RING
PF_RING is software that load balances network traffic originating from an Ethernet interface by hashing the IP headers into N buckets. This allows it to spawn N instances of Snort, each processing a single bucket and achieve higher throughput through multiprocessing. In order to take full advantage of this, you need a multicore processor (like an I7 with 8 processing threads) or a dual or quad processor board that increases parallelism even further across multiple chips.
In a related article we measured the performance of PF_RING with Snort inline at 1 Gbps on an I7 950. The results were impressive.
In this article we report on our experiment running Snort on a dual processor board with a total of 24 hyperthreads (using the Intel X5670). Besides measuring Snort processing throughput varying the number of rules, we also (1) changed the compiler used to compile Snort (GCC vs. ICC) and (2) compared PF_RING in NAPI mode (running 24 Snort processes in parallel) and PF_RING Direct NIC Access technology (DNA) (running 16 Snort processes in parallel).
PF_RING NAPI performs the hashing of the packets in software and has a traditional architecture where the packets are copied to user space by the driver. Snort is parallelized using 24 processes that are allowed to float on the 24 hardware threads while the interrupts are parallelized on 16 of the 24 hardware threads.
PF_RING DNA performs the hashing of the packets in hardware (using the Intel 52599 RSS functionality) and relies on 16 hardware queues. The DNA driver allows 16 instances of Snort to read packets directly from the hardware queues therefore virtually eliminating system-level processing overhead. The limitation of DNA is that (1) supports a maximum of 16x parallelism per 10G interface, (2) it only allows 1 process to attach to each hardware queue and (3) it costs a bit of money or requires Silicom cards(well worth it). (2) is significant because it does not allow multiple processes to receive the same data. So, for example if you run “tcpdump -i dna0″, you could not also run “snort -i dna0 -c config.snort -A console” at the same time. The second invocation would return an error.
GCC is the standard open source compiler that comes with CentOS 6 and virtually all other Unix systems. It is the foundation of open source and without it we would still be in the stone age (computationally).
ICC is an Intel proprietary compiler that goes much further in extracting instruction- and data-level parallelism of modern multicore processors such as the i7 and Xeons.
All results are excellent and show that you can build a 5-7 Gbps IDS using standard off-the-shelf machines and PF_RING. The system we used to perform these experiments is below:
The graph shows the sustained Snort performance of 4 different configurations using a varying number of Emerging Threats Pro rules. As expected, the number of rules has a dramatic effect on performance for all configurations (the more rules, the lower the performance). In all cases, memory access contention is likely to be the main limiting factor.
Given our experience, we think that our setup is fairly representative of an academic institution we have to admit that measuring Snort performance in the absolute is hard. No two networks are the same and rule configurations vary even more widely, nevertheless, the relative performance variations are important and of general interest. You can draw your own conclusions from the above graph; however here are some interesting observations:
At the high end (6900 rules) ICC makes a big difference by increasing the throughput by ~1 Gbps (25%)
GCC is just as good at maintaining throughput around 5 Gbps
PF_RING DNA is always better than PF_RING NAPI.
We describe below how to reproduce these numbers on Linux CentOS 6. If you do not want to go through these steps, we also provide this functionality through our security system (MSS) pre-packaged and ready to go. It would help us if you tried it and let us know what you think. If you want to go at it on your own, read the full article on our main website.
Block Torrents
Metaflows’ CEO and Chief Research Scientist, Livio Ricciulli, has developed a plugin for the Metaflows Security System that is able to block torrents and much more. While in passive mode, the “Isolate Plugin” uses TCP session disruption and packet spoofing to block torrents and any other kind of traffic by simply selecting any Snort rule in the Metaflows Rule Interface.
The Metaflows Security System can turn on the isolate plugin by modifying the sensor configuration and ticking the “Isolate” check box. If the Isolate plugin is left off, it will simulate the actions it would have taken and alert customers to the items it would have blocked.
The Isolate Plugin is an active response system that disrupts TCP (and sometimes UDP) sessions to block unwanted traffic like Torrents or other potentially disruptive applications. The active response mechanism works by injecting spoofed TCP reset packets as well as other session hijacking packets into the network. This gives IDS operators the ability to block unwanted traffic without having to modify firewall rules.
Infosec News We’re Reading
>>>>> SSL Hacked!

Law.com has a very interesting article about the ramifications for enterprise security after the high profile breaches of certificate authorities like DigiNotar and others this year. Link to full article on law.com
>>>>> Japan to boost cyber-security after defense contractor hacked
” ‘”The government will unite and take possible measures against cyber attacks, ” Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura told a news conference on Tuesday, adding that the upcoming meeting is expected to discuss ways to reinforce anti-cyber attack measures.’” Link to full article from Kuwait News Agency.
The giants of cloud security
To say that cloud computing has taken the business world by storm would be a massive understatement. To say that traditional security systems are in a place to deal with the new challenges posed by cloud computing would be an even greater understatement.
Cloud computing has disrupted the status quo for giants like Cisco and Juniper and others who sell physical network appliances. There are worlds upon worlds of wispy new network space to be secured but there is still no clear leader in cloud security.
What will the future of cloud security look like? Will it pan out much like the market for large enterprise network security: a few big players with many small and medium guys fighting over the rest?
Large network security companies have become very successful at selling products that work very well in the real world. Will their enormous success in the “real world” enable them to successfully navigate this new virtual territory? They certainly have enough money and human resources to try.
Or will the battle for the clouds be won by smaller companies that are already providing cloud security? I guess we’ll see. But if the ground starts to shake you’ll know what it is.
The “prevention” vs “detection” debate continues
A new e-book from SC Magazine continues the debate within the network security field about which is better: intrusion detection or intrusion prevention (you can download that here).
The point the author makes is that with the very public successes of recent attacks, the author wonders if companies aren’t spending too much time and money on prevention and not enough on detecting attacks. Companies should not stop working to keep attackers out, the rapid detection of successful intrusions should be a top priority.


Intrusion prevention systems (IPS), for the most part, involve very expensive network appliances that sit outside the network to prevent attacks from getting in. We call that “hard IPS”. A typical IPS could cost at least $10,000 or more plus maintenance fees.

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